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Matter of S-E-G-: The Final Nail in the Coffin
for Gang-Related Asylum Claims?
Lindsay M. Harris & Morgan M. Weibel∗
INTRODUCTION
1

In July 2008, the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed an
Immigration Judge’s (“IJ”) denial of asylum to three young Salvadoran siblings
fleeing gang violence and threats. This decision affects the likelihood that other
youth and their family members fleeing gang violence will gain protection in the
2
United States. The reach of the BIA decision in Matter of S-E-G- stretches far
beyond the facts of the actual case or gang cases in general and may shape the future
of asylum based on membership in a particular social group. The BIA published
Matter of S-E-G- as one of only 36 precedent decisions in 2008, making the decision
3
binding on all IJs as well as the BIA itself. The decision is important, as it appears
to elevate the notion of “social visibility” from a factor in the determination of a
particular social group to a requirement. This article examines how Matter of S-E-Ghas affected the legal landscape with regard to asylum claims based on particular
social group.
Part I of this paper provides a brief background on the Central American
gang problem. Part II briefly examines the state of the U.S. law on social group prior
to S-E-G-. Part III summarizes the decision itself, analyzes the problematic elements
of the decision, and provides an update as to the current status of the case. Part IV
examines U.S. case law following S-E-G- in the Circuit Courts of Appeal. Part V
presents an analysis of the potential impact of S-E-G- on other social group cases.
Part VI explores recent Canadian jurisprudence on gang-related persecution claims,
while the conclusion suggests how advocates and judges can move past S-E-G- to
carefully consider gang-related cases.
I. BACKGROUND ON THE CENTRAL AMERICAN GANG PHENOMENON
Asylum seekers generally flee persecution from one of two Central

∗ Lindsay M. Harris, J.D. 2009, University of California, Berkeley, School of Law (“Berkeley Law”);
Morgan M. Weibel, J.D. 2009, University of California, Hastings College of the Law. Thanks go to
Professor Kate Jastram at Berkeley Law and Karen Musalo, Kim Thuy Seelinger and Lisa Frydman at the
Center for Gender and Refugee Studies for their support. Lindsay Harris presented a version of this paper
at the Centre for Refugee Studies Annual Student Conference, “Documenting the Undocumented:
Redefining Refugee Status” at York University in Toronto, Canada, on April 16, 2009.
1. The Board of Immigration Appeals forms part of the official agency charged with enforcing
the Immigration and Nationality Act under control of the Attorney General of the United States.
Immigration and Nationality Act § 243(h), 8 U.S.C. 1253(h) (2009).
2. Matter of S-E-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 579 (B.I.A. 2008).
3. See Board of Immigration Appeals Precedent Decisions, Volume 24, available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/eoir/vll/intdec/nfvol24.htm (last visited Apr. 15, 2010).
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American gangs or “maras,” the Mara Salvatrucha, also known as MS or MS-13, and
4
the Mara 18. These gangs originated in the Salvadoran immigrant and refugee
5
community in Los Angeles, California in the 1980s. In 1996, Congress expanded
the list of offenses that constitute an “aggravated felony” and therefore grounds for
6
removal, while simultaneously eliminating relief from removal for such crimes. As
a result of these immigration reforms, the U.S. deported “more than 670,000
7
immigrants because of criminal convictions.” Many of the deportees had spent
most of their lives in the U.S., had few relatives remaining in their native lands, and
8
sometimes even struggled to speak the local language. Affiliation with their former
gangs for protection and support became a natural response and as a result, gangs
flourished in El Salvador and expanded into neighboring Guatemala, Honduras,
9
Mexico, and even Belize. In reaction to increasing gang-membership, many
countries began to enact sweeping anti-gang legislation such as El Salvador’s “Mano
Dura” or “tough fist” law, which associates gang membership with tattoos and calls
10
for the imprisonment of all tattooed individuals.
Such legislation not only
endangered civil liberties but also nearly doubled Latin American prison
11
populations. Strapped for resources to begin with, the prisons became breeding
12
grounds for gang violence, resulting in lethal riots and regular prison escapes. As
gang-members return to their local communities they recruit and expand gang forces
thus perpetuating the cycle of violence.
Today, asylum seekers fleeing gang-related persecution can be grouped into

4. The Central American gang phenomenon has been widely documented. See, e.g.,
Migration Policy Institute, Mary Helen Johnson, National Policies and the Rise of Transnational Gangs,
April 2006, available at http://www.migrationinformation.org/Feature/display.cfm?id=394 (last visited
Apr. 15, 2010); Jeffrey D. Corsetti, Marked for Death: The Maras of Central America and Those Who
Flee Their Wrath, 20 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 407 (2006).
5. Ricardo Pollack, Gang life tempts Salvador teens (Jan 24, 2005) available at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/4201183.stm; Daniel Schorn, The Fight Against MS-13: Dan Rather
On Difficult Fight Against Dangerous Gang (Dec. 4, 2005) available at http://www.cbs
news.com/stories/2005/12/01/60minutes/main1090941.shtml.
6. See Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat.
1214, and the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104208, 110 Stat. 3009-546.
7. See Freddy Funes, Removal of Central American Gang Members: How Immigration Laws
Fail to Reflect Global Reality, 63 U. MIAMI L. REV. 301, 307 (2008), (citing Deportees in Latin America
and the Caribbean: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the W. Hemisphere of the H. Comm. on Foreign
Affairs, 110th Cong. 24-26 (2007) (testimony of Gary Mead, Assistant Director for Management, Office
of Detention and Removal Operations, Bureau of U.S. Immigration and Customs Management, U.S.
Department of Homeland Security). For a comprehensive summary of how U.S. deportation of convicted
criminals or gang members has led to the gang problems in Central America that asylum seekers now flee.
See id. at 301-14. See generally Harvard Law School, No Place to Hide: Gangs and Clandestine Violence
in El Salvador (February 2007).
8. Juanita Darling, Inside Story: Mothers of the Banished; Over the Past Six Years, Thousands
of Convicts Have Been Deported to El Salvador. Many of these Young Men Have Left Families Behind in
Southern California. The Burden is Crushing. L.A. TIMES, November 21, 1999, at page 20.
9. Belize has historically been a safe haven for refugees fleeing Central American conflicts,
but recently gang activity has been reported in Belize. Pre-emptive strike against MS-13 Gang in Belize,
THE REPORTER (BELIZE) Nov. 2, 2007; Mara Presence in Belize,THE REPORTER (BELIZE) Nov. 9, 2007.
10. See Funes supra note 7 at 311.
11. Id. at 312. Between 2000 and 2005 El Salvador’s prison population doubled. Only
seventeen months after enacting its law, Honduras had arrested over 1500 tattooed men.
12. See Funes supra note 7 at 314-15.
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13

two main categories: former gang members and persons fleeing gang recruitment.
14
Although Immigration Judges and Courts of Appeal have sometimes treated
persons fleeing gang recruitment more sympathetically than former gang members,
both categories of individuals have generally been denied asylum thus far in the
15
United States.
II. THE NARROWING OF U.S. LAW ON PARTICULAR SOCIAL GROUP
Although Matter of S-E-G- has potentially wide-ranging ramifications for
social group cases, the cases preceding S-E-G- paved the way for this decision. U.S.
jurisprudence on social group was framed by the 1985 BIA opinion in Matter of
16
Acosta, which came only five years after the implementation of the Refugee Act.
In Acosta, the Board held that a social group must be a “group of persons all of
whom share a common, immutable characteristic,” and that the common
characteristic “must be one that the members of the group either cannot change, or
should not be required to change because it is fundamental to their individual
17
identities or consciences.”

13. Other commentators have grouped those fleeing gang-persecution in different ways,
particularly focusing on disaggregating the claims by gender. See Meghann Boyle, Paths to Protection:
Ideas, Resources, and Strategies for Presenting Central American Gang-related Asylum Claims, 07-11
Immigr. Briefings 1 (2007) (categorizing claimants into four categories: male former gang members and
male non-members, female former gang members and female non-members); Matthew J. Lister, GangRelated Asylum Claims: An Overview and Prescription, 38 U. MEM. L. REV 827 (2008) (categorizing
claimants as female applicants fleeing rape, trafficking, or violence from a gang, male applicants with no
former gang ties, and male former gang members); Melissa James, Fleeing the Maras: Child Gang
Members Seeking Refugee Status in the United States, 25 CHILD. LEGAL RTS. J. 3 (2005) (focusing on
child gang members fleeing gang persecution); Michele A. Voss, Young and Marked for Death:
Expanding the Definition of “Particular Social Group” in Asylum Law to Include Youth Victims of Gang
Persecution, 37 RUTGERS L.J. 235, 263-274 (2005) (analyzing gang claims in two categories – “former
gang members” and “youth recruited by gangs, or otherwise targeted by gangs”).
14. Briefly, the U.S. asylum system has two modes of applying for asylum. Applicants can
submit an affirmative application at an asylum office. An asylum officer may grant asylum or refer the
case to an immigration court. The Immigration Courts are located within the Department of Justice’s
Executive Office of Immigration Review. Asylum applications before the Immigration Court are either
referred cases from the asylum office, or defensive asylum applications submitted when the individual is
placed into removal proceedings. If the case is denied, the applicant appeals to the BIA, also housed under
the Department of Justice. An applicant can appeal from a BIA denial to one of the eleven U.S. federal
circuit Courts of Appeal. From there, there is a final, but rare, possibility of an appeal to the United States
Supreme Court if the court grants certiorari.
15. See, e.g., Arteaga v. Mukasey, 511 F. 3d 940 (9th Cir. 2007); Castellano-Chacon v. INS,
341 F. 3d 533 (6th Cir. 2003). For detailed discussion of the pre-S-E-G- case law involving gang-related
persecution claims, see Lister, supra note 13; Boyle, supra note 13 (discussing a number of Immigration
Judge decisions in the Center for Gender and Refugee Studies database relating to gang persecution); see
Voss, supra note 13 (discussing gang-related asylum cases from 2005 and earlier).
16. Matter of Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211 (B.I.A. 1985) (rejecting social group of taxi drivers
in El Salvador who were members of a taxi cooperative targeted by guerillas).
17. Id. at 233. See Fatma E. Marouf, The Emerging Importance of “Social Visibility” in
Defining a “Particular Social Group” and Its Potential Impact on Asylum Claims Related to Sexual
Orientation and Gender. 27 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 47, 51-58 (2008), discussing the Acosta approach. In
arriving at the immutable characteristic standard the BIA, first considered a “purely linguistic analysis” of
the social group ground, commenting that it may encompass groups of individuals of “certain relation”
such as coming from a “like class” or maintaining “kindred interests, such as shared ethnic, cultural, or
linguistic origins, education, family background, or perhaps economic activity.” Ultimately, the BIA
applied the doctrine of ejusdem generis, “of the same kind” in construing the phrase in relation to the other
enumerated grounds. The BIA reasoned that, because the other grounds, including race, religion, political
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More than two decades later, the BIA first articulated the notion of social
18
visibility in Matter of C-A-. Although the BIA claimed that it continued to “adhere
19
to the Acosta formulation,” it added the element of particularity, which Acosta had
20
never addressed. In Matter of C-A-, the BIA agreed with the IJ’s rejection of the
social group of “confidential informants against the Cali [drug] cartel,” in part due to
21
a lack of societal recognition of such a social group. The BIA elaborated on the
22
concept of “social visibility” in Matter of A-M-E- & J-G-U- finding that the
proposed group of “wealthy Guatemalans” was not readily identifiable because
“violence and crime in Guatemala appear to be pervasive at all socio-economic
23
levels.” A-M-E- also re-emphasized a need for “particularity,” which, in addition
to “social visibility,” was not considered in the Acosta decision that had shaped U.S.
asylum law for more than twenty years.
24

III. THE BOARD OF IMMIGRATION APPEALS DECISION IN MATTER OF S-E-G-

Matter of S-E-G- involved two Salvadoran teenage brothers who were
25
approached by MS-13 gang members and encouraged to join.
Although the
brothers were beaten and threatened, they did not report the attack to the police
26
because they feared retaliation and did not believe that the police would help. The
gang also threatened to rape the brothers’ older sister if they did not join. After
another boy in their neighborhood was killed for refusing to join, all three siblings
opinion, and nationality, are based upon an immutable characteristic, the social group ground should
likewise form its basis upon such a characteristic in order to be “comparable to the other four grounds of
persecution under the Act.” Id. at 219, 233. See, e.g., ATLE GRAHL-MADSEN, THE STATUS OF REFUGEES
IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 219 (1966). We should note that the Ninth Circuit developed another
formulation for social group, which requires a group to be united by a “voluntary association.” SanchezTrujillo v. INS, 801 F.2d 1571, 1574-75 (9th Cir. 1986).
18. The BIA themselves claim that social visibility has been present in their decision-making
for much longer. The concept was first referred to as “social visibility” in 2006. In re C-A-, 23 I. & N.
Dec. 951 (B.I.A. 2006), aff’d, Castillo-Arias v. United States AG, 46 F.3d 1190 (11th Cir. 2006), cert
denied sub nom. Castillo-Arias v. Gonzales, 549 U.S. 1115 (2007). For an extensive discussion of social
visibility see Marouf, supra note 17.
19. Matter of Acosta, 23 I. & N. Dec. 211 (BIA 1985).
20. In re C-A- 23 I. & N. Dec. 951, 957 (“The Eleventh Circuit has directed us to consider
whether ‘non-criminal informants’ are a particular social group in the context of this case. We find that
this group is too loosely defined to meet the requirement of particularity.”).
21. Id. at 953.
22. In re A-M-E- & J-G-U-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 69 (B.I.A. 2007) aff’d, Ucleo-Gomez v.
Mukasey, 509 F. 3d 70 (2d Cir. 2007). See also “Second Circuit Upholds BIA Decision that “Affluent
Guatemalans” Do Not Constitute a Particular Social Group,” 84 Interpreter Releases 2874 (Dec. 10,
2007).
23. A-M-E- and J-G-U-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 69 (BIA 2007); see also, 84 No. 41 Interpreter
Releases 2461. But see Romero v. Mukasey, 2008 WL 268682 (2d Cir. 2008) (unpublished) (finding
social group of wealthy landowners and businessmen to be acceptable as it was not defined solely by
wealth).
24. A companion case to S-E-G-, Matter of E-A-G-, was also published on July 30, 2008.
Matter of E-A-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 591 (July 30, 2008) (holding that “persons resistant to gang
membership” were not socially visible in Honduras, and that membership in a particular social group of
“Young persons who are perceived to be affiliated with gangs” was not a social group because actual
membership in a criminal gang is not a social group). We focus on S-E-G- here as it is a longer opinion
and E-A-G- specifically refers the reader to S-E-G- for additional detail of the evolving case law on
particular social group. Id. at 6.
25. Matter of S-E-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 579.
26. Id. at 2.
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27

(the “Miras”) fled El Salvador and sought asylum in the United States.
In a decision by Board Member Grant, the BIA affirmed an IJ’s denial of
asylum to the three Salvadoran youths, Pablo, Silvia, and Rene Mira. Although the
IJ found the siblings credible, the IJ found that (1) the Miras had not suffered past
persecution; (2) they had not established nexus either to membership in a particular
social group or to a political opinion; and (3) that the attack and threats occurred
28
because the gang wanted to recruit new members. Further, the IJ held that the
Salvadoran government’s efforts to control gangs disproved the Miras’ contention
that the government was unwilling or unable to control gangs within its
29
jurisdiction.
The BIA affirmed the IJ’s rejection of the Mira siblings’ asylum claims
based on a well-founded fear of persecution on account of 1) their anti-gang political
opinion; 2) their social group of “Salvadoran youth who have been subjected to
recruitment efforts by MS-13 and who have rejected or resisted membership in the
gang based on their own personal, moral and religious opposition to the gang’s
values and activities;” and 3) their social group of family members of such
30
Salvadoran youth.
A. The BIA Found that an Anti-Gang Opinion is Not a Political Opinion
With regard to political opinion, the BIA found that the Miras did not show
that they had a “political motive in resisting gang recruitment or a well-founded fear
31
of future persecution on account of their political opinion.” The BIA found the
evidence in the record insufficient to show that the Miras were “politically active or
32
made anti-gang political statements.” This reasoning suggests that only those who
put themselves in more danger, by openly criticizing dangerous gangs, will be
eligible for asylum based on their political opinion. The BIA did not address the
33
argument that refusal to join the gang demonstrates a political opinion. Ultimately,
even if victims of gang persecution organized to become politically active and
outspoken against gangs, a claim based on political opinion would still be denied
under S-E-G because the BIA refused to equate anti-gang opinion with political
opinion. Although S-E-G- itself did not present the strongest facts regarding political
opinion, courts have denied claims even in cases where the individuals have engaged
in more openly visible political activities. These decisions appear to overlook the
practical realities of gangs, while at least one expert on Salvadoran gangs has gone
34
so far as to say that the gangs themselves are political entities. Gangs, through
27. For a more detailed presentation of the facts, see Anne Marie Gallagher, Refugees and
Asylees; Temporary Protected Status (TPS), 2 Immigration Law Service 2d §10:164 (2009); Neither
Youths Who Resist Gang Recruitment Nor Their Families Are a “Particular Social Group,” BIA Finds, 85
No. 30 Interpreter Releases 2104 (2008). Alternatively, the decision itself summarizes the facts. See
Matter of S-E-G, 24 I. & N. Dec. 579 at 1-5.
28. Matter of S-E-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 579, 581 (B.I.A. 2008). The IJ’s decision itself is not
publicly available. A number of other commentators have summarized Matter of S-E-G-. See Gallagher,
supra note 27; Interpreter Releases supra note 16; see also Funes, supra note 7 at 326-28.
29. Id. at 5.
30. Id. at 5-6.
31. Id. at 22.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 24-25.
34. See Max Manwaring, Street Gangs: The New Urban Insurgency, Strategic Studies
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their illegal actions, can be assumed to be anti-government and against the rule of
law. It seems logical to therefore conclude that those who oppose the gangs may do
so for political opinions, based on strong moral or religious beliefs in the rule of law
and faith in the government.
B. The BIA Found the Mira Siblings’ Particular Social Group to Lack
Particularity and Social Visibility.
The BIA found the proposed social group of “Salvadoran youth . . . who
have rejected or resisted membership in the gang based on their own personal, moral,
and religious opposition to the gang’s values and activities” to be problematic on a
35
number of levels. First, the BIA said that while youth is a mutable characteristic
(evidenced by the fact that respondents are no longer “children”), “age is not within
one’s control” and as such, social group claims based on age “may still be
36
cognizable.” Further, the Board stated the well-established principle that a social
group cannot be defined “exclusively by the fact that its members have been
37
subjected to harm in the past.” This reasoning ignores, however, the other aspects
of the proposed social group in S-E-G-, including moral and religious beliefs and is
38
inconsistent with established precedent.
Moral and religious beliefs are
undoubtedly the kind of fundamental characteristic that an individual should not be
39
required to change in order to avoid persecution.
Therefore, under Acosta, the
Miras’ proposed social group should be valid.
The BIA then discussed its recent decisions, “holding that membership in a
purported social group requires that the group have particular and well-defined
40
boundaries, and that it possesses a recognized level of social visibility.” The BIA
asserted that particularity and social visibility “give specificity to the definition of a
41
social group.” In addressing particularity, the BIA found that the Miras’ social
42
group did not meet the “particularity requirement of the refugee definition.” The
BIA reasoned that the proposed social group represents “a potentially large and
43
diffuse segment of society” and concluded that the Mira Siblings were “therefore
not in a substantially different situation from anyone who has crossed the gang, or
44
who is perceived to be a threat to the gang’s interest.”
Institute, U.S. Army War College (March 2005) 12-15, available at http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.
army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=597 (describing Central American gangs as political entities, rather
than merely criminal entities) (last visited Apr. 15, 2010).
35. Matter of S-E-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 579, 581 (B.I.A. 2008).
36. Id. at 583-84. The Third Circuit took a similar position in Lukwago v. Aschroft, 329 F.3d
157, 170-73 (3d Cir. 2003) (finding that while “children from Northern Uganda who are abducted and
enslaved” by a guerilla organization are not part of a social group under a past persecution analysis,
“children who have escaped from involuntary servitude after being abducted and enslaved” by the same
entity have a social group claim for future persecution).
37. Id. at 12.
38. See Brief for The Center for Gender and Refugee Studies as Amici Curiae, in support of
Petitioner’s Petition for Rehearing and Rehearing en banc. Santos-Lemus v. Mukasey, 542 F.3d 738 (9th
Cir. 2008).
39. See Matter of Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211 (B.I.A. 1985).
40. Matter of S-E-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 579, 582 (B.I.A. 2008).
41. Id.
42. Id. at 585 (emphasis added).
43. Id.
44. Id. at 587 (finding that “[i]t is difficult to conclude that any ‘group’ is actually perceived
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Although the Mira brothers defined their social group with more
particularity than many other social groups found valid in the past, the BIA
nonetheless found a lack of particularity. The brothers asserted that their group was
defined more specifically as “male children who lack stable families and meaningful
adult protection, who are from middle and low income classes and live in territories
45
controlled by the MS-13 gang, and who refuse recruitment.” The BIA found a lack
of particularity for two reasons. First, the BIA said that the characteristics were
46
amorphous because “people’s ideas of what terms mean can vary.” Second, the
BIA found no evidence in the record showing that gang members limit recruitment
47
efforts to the specified social group. The first rationale for a lack of particularity
seems to involve social visibility in the particularity analysis – asking what other
“people,” presumably members of Salvadoran society, would interpret the asserted
group characteristics to mean. Because society’s views on what certain terms mean
48
will always vary, this means that the particularity requirement will never be met.
The second rationale seems irrelevant – the fact that a persecutor persecutes a second
group should not undermine the particularity of the first group.
The BIA is unclear as to whether social visibility is a factor or a
requirement in the social group determination. In one sentence, the BIA explains,
“we have recently reaffirmed the importance of social visibility as a factor in the
49
particular social group definition.” Just one sentence later, the BIA “reaffirm[ed]
the requirement that the shared characteristic of the group should be recognizable by
50
others in the community.”
The BIA explained in its opinion that the United
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees’ (UNHCR) 2002 social group guidelines
“endorse an approach in which an important factor is whether the members of the
51
group are ‘perceived as a group by society.’” Later, in citing Matter of A-M-E- &
J-G-U-, the Board referred to social visibility as “requisite,” suggesting once again
52
that social visibility is required for all social groups. Unlike Matter of C-A-, where
53
social visibility was treated as a “relevant factor,” in S-E-G-, the BIA concluded
54
that the proposed social group “fails the ‘social visibility’ test.” This lack of clarity
on whether social visibility is a factor or a requirement indicates a lack of
55
consistency, so under Chevron, Circuit courts should not afford the BIA deference

by the criminal gangs, is much narrower than the general population of El Salvador”).
45. Id. at 585.
46. Id. (internal citation omitted).
47. Id.
48. See Marouf, supra note 17 at 71 discussing the inherent difficulty in assessing society’s
perception in the country origin.
49. Matter of S-E-G-, 241 & N. Dec. at 17 (emphasis added).
50. Id. at 18 (emphasis added).
51. Id. (emphasis added).
52. Id. at 19.
53. The Harvard Immigration and Refugee Clinic (HIRC) and the Central American Resource
Center (CARECEN) noted this inconsistency in their amicus brief for a later Ninth Circuit case. Brief for
Harvard Immigration and Refugee Clinic and Central American Resource Center as Amici Curiae in
support of petitioner’s petition for rehearing and rehearing en banc in Santos-Lemus v. Mukasey, 542 F.3d
738 (9th Cir. 2008), see Section V(d)’s Discussion of Ninth Circuit jurisprudence for more information on
the Santos-Lemus case.
54. Matter of S-E-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 22.
55. Briefly, the particular social group category has often been classified as the “least welldefined on its face” of the INA’s five protected grounds leading courts to afford great Chevron deference
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56

in this inconsistent approach.
The BIA did not address the government’s willingness or ability to control
the gang, because they found the respondent’s failure to demonstrate a nexus to a
57
protected ground dispositive.
C. Current Developments in Matter of S-E-GOn February 23, 2009, while on appeal at the Eighth Circuit, the attorneys
58
in Matter of S-E-G- sent a request to Attorney General Eric Holder for certification.
On July 28, 2009, the BIA reopened the case at the request of a joint motion filed by
59
the Miras and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS).
The Miras filed
motions to reopen and reconsider with the BIA, submitted requests for certification
of Matter of S-E-G- to Attorney General Holder, and pursued a petition for review at
60
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit. The BIA denied the motion to
reopen in June 2009 while the Eighth Circuit appeal and request for certification
61
remained pending.
On July 6, 2009, Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) agents
unexpectedly arrested and detained the Miras and set their removal for the last week
62
of July. ICE summarily denied the Miras’ requests for an administrative stay and
63
the Eighth Circuit denied a judicial stay.
The Miras then filed an emergency
64
application for a stay of removal with Supreme Court Justice Alito. He denied the
application and the respondents refiled with Justice Stevens who referred the matter
65
to the full court. When the full court requested the government’s response by July
66
29, 2009, ICE released the respondents. DHS’s appellate counsel and the Solicitor

to BIA interpretations. Koudriachova v. Gonzales, 490 F.3d 255, 260 (2d Cir. 2007). The principle of
agency deference was first established by the Supreme Court in Chevron U. S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources
Defense Council, Inc, 467 U.S. 837 (1984). The test derived from Chevron is two pronged; first, a court
determines whether or not “Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue” and second, if
Congressional intent is not clear, then a court considers “whether the agency’s answer is based on a
permissible construction of the statute.” Id. at 842-43.
56. In their Santos-Lemus briefs HIRC and CARECEN argue that the Ninth Circuit should
have remanded to the agency to decide whether social visibility is a factor or a requirement. In the
alternative, the Court should not give the social visibility requirement deference as the BIA departed from
its former precedent, treating social visibility as only a factor, in a “sudden and unexplained” manner.
HIRC & CARACEN amicus, supra note 53 at 14, citing Brand X.
57. Matter of S-E-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 26.
58. Bress, Mallen, Alvino-McGill, Stuhlman, and Casper, Request for Attorney General
Certification of Matter of S-E-G Feb. 23, 2009 available at://www.immigrantlawcentermn.org/Litigation/
Resources/SEG-AG_Certification_request_final.pdf (last visited Apr. 15, 2010); see also Joe Palazzolo,
Holder Asked to Review Asylum Decision, Legal Times, March 02, 2009, available at
http://www.law.com/jsp/dc/Pub ArticleDC.jsp?id=1202428585096&hub=TopStories (last visited Apr. 15,
2010).
59. John Keller, “BIA reopens, remands Matter of S-E-G-, ID 3617, 24 I&N Dec. 579 (BIA
2008)” (July 28, 2009), available at http://drop.io/uobx4ey (last visited Apr. 15, 2010).
60. See Palazzolo supra note 58.
61. See Keller supra note 59.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
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67

General’s office then contacted respondents and offered a joint motion to reopen.
The two Mira brothers were found eligible to reapply despite the fact that
both are now over the age of eighteen because both were under the age of eighteen
68
when they first filed for asylum. Although the William Wilburforce Trafficking
Victims Protection and Reauthorization Act of 2008 does not cover the Miras’ older
sister, the BIA reopened her case alongside the others because all three siblings
present the “same underlying claim” and reopening will “facilitate having that claim
69
adjudicated in a consistent manner.” As of January 2010, all three cases remain
pending at the asylum office. While the Miras may eventually be granted relief, the
decision itself remains in effect. As the S-E-G- attorneys argued in their requests for
certification, the BIA’s decision has wide-ranging implications for asylum law, and
70
may still render social visibility a requirement in all future social group cases.
UNHCR maintains that the BIA misconstrued the UNHCR Social Group
71
Guidelines. Under the Guidelines, the “social perception” approach should only be
invoked if the requirement of a “protected characteristic”—a common immutable
72
characteristic—is not met.
UNHCR explains that “the second inquiry is an
alternative to be considered if and only if a determination is made that the group
73
characteristic is neither immutable nor fundamental.”
UNHCR focuses on the
“social perception” analysis, explaining that there is no requirement that the
“common attribute [be] visible to the naked eye in a literal sense of the term or that it
74
be one that is easily recognizable to the general public.” Instead, the UNHCR
approach to social group determination rests on whether a group is ‘cognizable’ or
75
‘set apart from society at large’ in some way.” The UNHCR social perception
approach does not require group members to be individually recognized by the
general public, but just for the group as a whole to be recognized in society.
UNHCR notes the absence of a “social visibility” or “social perception” requirement
76
in Acosta and other fundamental U.S. social group cases.

67. Id.
68. The Miras’eligibility was found pursuant to the William Wilburforce Trafficking Victims
Protection and Reauthorization Act of 2008. Joint Motion of U.S. Department of Homeland Security and
Respondents to Reopen Proceedings, Matter of S-E-G-, (July 23, 2009), available at
http://drop.io/uobx4ey (last visited Apr. 15, 2010).
69. Id.
70. Request for Attorney General Certification of Matter of S-E-G, supra note 58 at 5.
71. Thomas Albrecht, UNHCR, Letter to Attorney General Holder Requesting Certification
and Review of Matter of S-E-G-, March 18, 2009 (on file with author) [hereinafter “UNHCR letter”],
citing UNHCR Guidelines on International Protection: “Membership of a Particular Social Group”
HCR/GIP/02/02 (May 7, 2002). See also Brief for the UNHCR as Amicus Curaie Supporting Claimants
in Thomas at 8, available at: http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/country,,,AMICUS,ZAF,456d621e2,45c3
4c244,0.html (“members of a group need not be easily recognizable to the general public in order for the
group as a whole to be perceived by society as a particular social group.”).
72. UNHCR letter, supra note 71 at 3.
73. Id. (emphasis added).
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 4, citing Matter of Kasinga, 21 I. & N. Dec. 357 (BIA 1996); Matter of Fuentes, 19
I. & N. Dec. 658 (BIA 1988); Matter of Toboso-Alfonso, 20 I. & N. Dec. 819 (BIA 1990).
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IV. MATTER OF S-E-G- AFFECTS SOCIAL GROUP CASES ACROSS THE CIRCUITS.
In the year following the decision, ten of the eleven U.S. Circuit Courts of
Appeal cited Matter of S-E-G-, although the Third, Fourth, and Fifth Circuits did not
77
publish any of their decisions on the matter. These cases involve both gang-related
claims and non-gang related claims, but in all cases asylum was denied. We first
address the cases involving gangs. In considering these claims, three circuits, the
Sixth, Ninth, and Eleventh seem to have adopted social visibility as a requirement
while the Eighth goes no further than adopting S-E-G’s contention that refusal to join
a gang does not constitute a political opinion. The Seventh Circuit remains the only
circuit to have outright rejected S-E-G-’s new social group requirements.
A. Circuits Applying S-E-G’s Social Visibility to Gang Cases
Constrained by Chevron deference, the Sixth, Ninth and Eleventh Circuits
have all adopted S-E-G-’s use of social visibility as a requirement for social group
membership. Despite its lack of jurisdiction to review the merits of the petitioner’s
asylum claim because he failed to exhaust his administrative remedies, the Sixth
78
Circuit appears to cite S-E-G- with approval in Herrera-Flores v. Mukasey. The
petitioner in Herrera-Flores was a 28-year-old Salvadoran man who claimed that
79
gang members trying to recruit him would kill him if he returned to El Salvador.
Judge Griffin lamented that the respondent cited no authority to support his proposed
social group of “young Salvadoran males who fear gang recruitment or who choose
80
not to join gangs.” Judge Griffin cited S-E-G-’s rejection of the social group for
failing the social visibility test. Thus, the Sixth Circuit adopts a blanket approach to
determinations on the validity of a social group, finding that where a group is not
socially visible in one case, it cannot be in another.
In Gomez-Benitez v. Mukasey, the Eleventh Circuit found that Honduran
schoolboys who conscientiously refuse to join gangs also did not constitute a social
81
group. The Gomez-Benitez court cites both S-E-G- and E-A-G- with approval to
82
support the lack of social visibility for the proposed social group.
The Court
focused on the lack of particularity, finding that “Gomez’s purported group is so
broad and persecution-defined that recognizing it under the Immigration and
Nationality Act would permit the ‘particular social group’ persecution basis to
become a ‘catch all’ ground for all persons alleging persecution in Honduras who
83
cannot establish refugee status under any of the other recognized grounds.” This

77. See, e.g., Galindo-Torres v. Holder, 348 Fed. Appx. 814 (3d Cir. 2009); ContrerasMartinez v. Holder, 346 Fed. Appx. 956 (4th Cir. 2009); Mendoza-Marquez v. Holder, 345 Fed. Appx. 31
(5th Cir. Aug. 24, 2009); Orellana-Monson v. Holder, 332 Fed. Appx. 202 (5th Cir. 2009); Cruz-Alvarez
v. Holder, 320 Fed. Appx. 273, 274 (5th Cir. 2009).
78. Herrera-Flores v. Mukasey, 297 Fed. Appx. 389, 29-30 (6th Cir. 2008).
79. Id. at 2.
80. Id. at 29.
81. Gomez-Benitez v. Mukasey, 295 Fed. Appx. 324, 1 (11th Cir. 2008).
82. Id. at 326. In a subsequent and unpublished decision, the Eleventh Circuit rejected a
Salvadoran family’s asylum claim based on the rape and harassment of a daughter who refused to join the
Maras, for failure to meet the social visibility test. See De Vasquez v. United States AG, 345 Fed. Appx.
441 (11th Cir. 2009).
83. Id.
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Eleventh Circuit decision clearly articulates the rationale likely underlying many of
the gang-related asylum cases: the “floodgates” argument, which arises from fears
that once asylum is open to those fleeing gang persecution little remains to stop any
victim of violence or crime from seeking asylum successfully. This fear was also
84
asserted in reference to gender-related persecution claims. Fears that the United
States would be flooded with women fleeing Female Genital Cutting have not,
85
however, materialized. Furthermore, the size of a persecuted group is irrelevant to
whether asylum should be granted. The number of political dissidents fleeing
communist regimes during the Cold War was large, yet these dissidents were granted
asylum. Youth fleeing gang persecution are exactly the kind of group that the social
group ground was intended to address – to give refugee status to those suffering
persecution on account of their membership in a particular social group not
86
otherwise covered by race, religion, nationality, or political opinion.
87
The Ninth Circuit first embraced Matter of S-E-G-’s reasoning in SantosLemus v. Mukasey, where Judge Wallace, writing for the panel, affirmed the BIA’s

84. See Karen Musalo, Protecting Victims of Gendered Persecution: Fear of Floodgates, or
call TO (Principled) Action? 14 Va. J. Soc. Pol’y & L. 119 (2007). Musalo advocates for a principled
approach, crafting policy responses and strategies to address the root causes of gendered persecution.
85. Id. at 132-34 (explaining why the fear of floodgates with respect to gendered persecution
claims is unwarranted. Like women, children fleeing gang persecution often lack the resources to flee the
persecution they experience and are dependent on their family members located in the country of origin
for daily support).
86. The term “membership in a particular social group” first appeared in U.S. law, in the 1980
Refugee Act, which was specifically drafted to bring the U.S. into compliance with its treaty obligations
under the 1967 Protocol to the International Refugee Convention. See, S.Rep. No. 96-256, 96th Congress,
1st Session (1979), Report on the Refugee Act of 1979 at 1, 4 (“the new definition will bring United States
law into conformity with our international treaty obligations under the United Nations Protocol Relating to
the Status of Refugees which the United States ratified in November 1968, and the United Nations
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees which is incorporated by reference into the United States
law through the Protocol.”). In short, there are two historical approaches to the development of the social
group category in international law. The first considers the 1951 Refugee Convention’s terminology as
arising from the International Refugee Organization’s 1946 Constitution. That Constitution included
protection of groups such as “children who are war orphans or whose parents have disappeared, and who
are outside their country of origin,” Spanish Republicans, and victims of Nazi or Fascist regimes. See
Constitution of the International Refugee Organization, and Agreement on Interim Measures to be Taken
in Respect of Refugees and Displaced Persons, Annex I, Sixty-Fifth Plenary Meeting, December 14, 1946.
Interestingly enough, any of the aforementioned social groups would easily meet the Acosta standard’s
immutable characteristic test in that they all share the immutable experiences of their social groups.
However, aside from the Nazi victims who were tattooed with prisoner identification numbers, many of
these refugees would not meet the social visibility standard as established by Matter of C-A-. The second
approach looks to the negotiating history of the 1951 Refugee Convention as it unfolded during the
conference of plenipotentiaries. There, Swedish delegate Sture Petren requested the addition of: “a
reference to persons who might be persecuted owing to their membership of a particular social group.
[As] [s]uch cases existed, and it would be as well to mention them explicitly.” 26 November 1951
Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Status of Refugees and Stateless Persons: Summary Record of the
Nineteenth Meeting Doc Symbol: A/CONF.2/SR.19. Other commentators agreed with the need for a gapfiller, mentioning that “experience ha[s] shown that certain refugees ha[ve] been persecuted because they
belonged to particular social groups. The draft convention makes no provision for such cases, and one
designated to cover them should be accordingly included.” See Maryellen Fullerton, A Comparative Look
at Refugee Status Based on Persecution Due to Membership in a Particular Social Group, 26 Cornell Int’l
L. J. 508 (1993). The amendment including a particular social group in the refugee definition was adopted
by 14 votes to none, with 8 abstentions. Conference of Plenipotentiaries, A/CONF.2/SR.19.
87. The Ninth and Second Circuits see the highest volume of immigration cases in the U.S.
and thus are considered leaders in this area of the law. The Ninth Circuit has thus produced more cases in
this specific subject area since S-E-G was issued in July 2008.
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88

denial of asylum to a Salvadoran man fleeing gang persecution. Like the Mira
siblings in S-E-G-, the petitioner in Santos-Lemus had proposed two social groups –
the first based on family, the second based on his resistance to gangs. The BIA
found that the presence of Santos-Lemus’s mother in El Salvador undermined his
family-as-a-social-group claim. Reading social visibility as a requirement, the BIA
found Santos-Lemus’s second asserted social group to be undermined by the lack of
social visibility. On political opinion, the BIA held that “resistance to gangs or ‘anti89
gang opinions’ is not a ‘protected political opinion.’”
The Ninth Circuit found that Santos-Lemus was “victimized for economic
and personal reasons” and that “[t]hese motivations do not constitute persecution on
90
account of political opinion.” Further, the court found no evidence of a gang belief
91
system.
Critics, however, argue that the BIA failed to “analyze Mr. SantosLemus’s reasons for opposing the gangs to determine whether his opinion could be
92
considered ‘political.’”
Further, there must be an individualized analysis on
political opinion and that the Santos-Lemus court affirmed the BIA’s “per se ruling
93
that anti-gang beliefs can never be political.” Indeed, the creation of such a per se
rule “conflicts with well-established precedent that the determination of what
94
constitutes political opinion must be made on a case by case basis.”
The Ninth Circuit, like the BIA in Matter of S-E-G-, inconsistently
discussed social visibility as both a factor and a requirement in the social group
definition. Initially, the Santos-Lemus court explained that it considers “certain
factors,” including particularity and social visibility, citing Matter of A-M-E- & J-G95
U-. Later, the court stated that although Matter of S-E-G- was not “binding on
[it],” the Ninth Circuit had “already adopted the Board’s particularity and social
visibility requirements in determining whether a purported association or
96
characteristic creates a particular social group.” Finally, the Santos-Lemus court
adopted social visibility as a requirement, holding that “Santos-Lemus’s group fails
97
to qualify as a particular social group because it lacks social visibility.”
Social visibility determinations must be based on the facts and context of a
98
particular country. The Santos-Lemus court erred in finding S-E-G- dispositive on

88. Santos-Lemus v. Mukasey, 542 F.3d 738 (9th Cir. 2008). One other decision, BarahonaSalguero v. Holder, 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 4369 (9th Cir. 2009) cites Santos-Lemus for the standard of
review of the BIA decision. Another decision cites Santos-Lemus in denying the Salvadoran petitioner
relief under the Convention Against Torture. See Enriquez-Menjivar v. Holder, 313 Fed. Appx. 967 (9th
Cir. 2009).
89. Id. at 746.
90. Id. at 747.
91. Id.
92. CGRS Santos-Lemus amicus brief, supra note 38.
93. Id. at 4.
94. Id. at 5 (citing Caceres-Cuadras v. I.N.S., 912 F.2d 468 (9th Cir. 1990)).
95. Santos-Lemus, 542 F.3d 738 at 744.
96. Id. at 745 (emphasis added). But note that the Ninth Circuit has since held that “[b]ecause
the BIA’s determination that a certain group is or is not a ‘particular social group’ is part of its effort to
give an ambiguous statutory term concrete meaning, we hold that Chevron deference is due.” See RamosLopez v. Holder, 563 F.3d 855, 879 (9th Cir. 2009).
97. Id. at 746.
98. CGRS Santos-Lemus amicus brief, supra note 38 at 7 (citing In re A-M-E- and J-G-U“Whether a proposed group has a shared characteristic with the requisite ‘social visibility’ must be
considered in the context of the country of concern and the persecution feared.”)
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the factual issue of whether “young men in El Salvador who oppose gang violence”
99
have social visibility.
This is impermissible according to a 1969 Ninth Circuit
case, Kovac, which found that an individual was “entitled to a determination” based
100
on the facts of his own case, and “not of others.”
The lawyers for Santos-Lemus filed a petition for rehearing en banc,
supported by amicus briefs. The Center for Gender and Refugee Studies’ (CGRS)
101
amicus brief noted that the Santos-Lemus court’s cites Arteaga v. Mukasey, which
rejected petitioner’s proposed social group of tattooed former gang members,
because granting relief to “violent street gangs who assault people and who traffic in
102
drugs and commit theft” would be contrary to the purposes of asylum law.
CGRS
argued that Arteaga does not support Santos-Lemus, but rather highlights the
underlying policy rationales in defining a social group. CGRS explained that the
Arteaga court “[did] not apply the criteria of social visibility as a straitjacket which
prevents it from applying the law in a manner inconsistent with its understanding of
103
congressional intent.”
Arguably, it would similarly violate congressional intent to
exclude “young men of conscience, who motivated by their moral and religious
104
beliefs, reject gang membership.”
The Santos-Lemus court decided the particularity issue by referencing S-EG- and other “relevant [Ninth Circuit] case law,” holding that the social group of
“young men in El Salvador resisting gang violence is too loosely defined to meet the
105
requirement for particularity.”
The court also found that the “harassment appears
106
to have been part of general criminality and civil unrest.”
The court found
“nothing to distinguish [Santos-Lemus] from the rest of the population or cause
107
others who oppose gang violence to recognize him as a member of their ‘group.’”
The Ninth Circuit denied the petition for rehearing and rehearing en banc in
108
Santos-Lemus without opinion in February 2009.
Therefore, Santos-Lemus, and
by implication, Matter of S-E-G-, are firmly entrenched in Ninth Circuit
jurisprudence. In the year following the Ninth Circuit’s Santos-Lemus decision, the
109
court cited it on at least forty-four occasions.
99. Id. at 8. In a similar vein, the Court recently held that S-E-G-’s determination could
preclude a claim from a Honduran youth who refused recruitment because the “same gang [wa]s at issue
albeit in different countries.” Ramos-Lopez v. Holder, 563 F.3d 855, 860 (9th Cir. 2009). The Court
further extended this reasoning to an applicant from neighboring Guatemala and to other “rival” gangs in
Barrios v. Holder, 567 F.3d 451, 456 (9th Cir. 2009) (“The BIA’s reasoning in Matter of S-E-G- is no less
applicable to the Mara 13 (or an equivalent gang) in Guatemala. Because Ramos claims persecution by
either the Mara 13 or a rival Central American gang, our decision in Ramos-Lopez controls.”)
100. Brief for Amicus Curiae, Santos-Lemus, 542 F.3d 738 (No. 07-70604) (citing Kovac v.
INS, 407 F.2d 102 (9th Cir. 1969)).
101. Arteaga v. Mukasey, 511 F.3d 940 (9th Cir. 2007).
102. Id. at 945.
103. CGRS Santos-Lemus Brief for Amicus Curiae, supra note 38, at 10.
104. Id.
105. Santos-Lemus, 542 F.3d at 745-46.
106. Id. at 746.
107. Id.
108. Although the denial of rehearing en banc is not available online, the authors learned that
the petition for rehearing en banc had been denied from the Center for Gender and Refugee Studies, who
had submitted an amicus brief in the case.
109. Many of these decisions have cited Santos-Lemus for propositions unrelated to social
visibility and social group and many of the decisions are unpublished memorandum dispositions. For
example, at least six cases have cited Santos-Lemus, holding that an applicant’s fear of future persecution
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Several cases have cited Santos-Lemus’s holding that social groups
110
involving gangs are not valid social groups for asylum purposes.
In Ramos-Lopez
v. Holder, a case involving a seventeen-year-old Honduran who fled after refusing
recruitment by the MS-13, the Ninth Circuit revisited social visibility. In that case,
Judge Tashima classified threats and harassment faced by individuals refusing gang
recruitment as a “sad part of the ‘general criminality and civil unrest’ perpetrated and
perpetuated by the MS-13 in Central America” and found no evidence that those
111
recruited by gangs were socially visible. Judge Tashima used Ramos-Lopez’s own
testimony that Honduran police take indiscriminate action against “children who are
not in gangs in their efforts to curb gang activity” to further highlight the absence of
112
social visibility in his purported social group.
In fact, Tashima found that “while
MS-13 members may be able to identify those who have resisted recruitment, it is
not because the group, as a group, is visible; rather, MS-13 members appear to keep
113
tabs on individuals who have refused to join.
Judge Tashima’s comment
illuminates one of the strongest criticisms of the use of social visibility as a
requirement – why should society’s perception of an individual inhibit protection,
when it was the persecutor’s own perception of that individual which motivated the
harm in the first place and will lead to any reasonable fear of future harm?
Much like the Ninth Circuit’s treatment of social visibility and particularity,
the Second, Fourth and Fifth Circuits have all issued decisions adopting S-E-G-’s
“requirements” in gang-related cases, but none have chosen to publish their
114
decisions.
It is as yet unclear what guides the decision to issue unpublished nonbased on membership in a particular social group of “family” is undermined by similarly situated family
members remaining in the country of origin without harm. See Aviles-Chavez v. Holder, 317 Fed. Appx.
678, 679 (9th Cir. 2009) (denying a petition for review because the “questions raised for review are so
insubstantial as not to require further argument” because the court had previously rejected the argument
that resistance to joining gangs in El Salvador constitutes political opinion); Rojas-Ayala v. Holder, 316
Fed. Appx. 621, 622 (9th Cir. 2009) (citing Santos-Lemus to hold that “a general aversion to gangs does
not constitute a political opinion for asylum purposes,” and also citing to the Santos-Lemus holding on
particularity as a requirement for social group cases). At least two cases have cited Santos-Lemus’
holding on political opinion with approval. See Aviles-Chavez, 317 Fed. Appx. at 678-79 (denying a
petition for review because the “questions raised for review are so insubstantial as not to require further
argument” because the court had previously rejected the argument that resistance to joining gangs in El
Salvador constitutes political opinion.); Rojas-Ayala, 316 Fed. Appx. at 622 (citing Santos-Lemus to hold
that “a general aversion to gangs does not constitute a political opinion for asylum purposes,” and also
citing to the Santos-Lemus holding on particularity as a requirement for social group cases).
110. See Chavez-Arevalo v. Mukasey, 308 Fed. Appx. 126, 127 (9th Cir. 2008) (denying
petition for review because “victimization by criminal gang for personal or economic reasons is not
persecution on account of protected ground”); Garcia v. Mukasey, 300 Fed. Appx. 530, 531(9th Cir. 2008)
(denying petition for review of Salvadoran woman fleeing gang persecution and citing Santos-Lemus
holding that “[young men] in El Salvador resisting gang violence” is not a particular social group for
purposes of asylum” with approval).
111. Ramos-Lopez v. Holder, 563 F.3d 855, 862 (9th Cir. 2009).
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. See, e.g., Vasquez v. Holder, 343 Fed. Appx. 681, 683 (2d Cir. 2009) (“We defer to the
agency’s interpretation of the statute as announced in Matter of S-E-G- and Matter of E-A-G-. Because
those decisions are virtually indistinguishable from the instant case, we conclude that Vasquez’s social
group claim must fail.”); Contreras-Martinez v. Holder, 346 Fed. Appx. 956, 958-59 (4th Cir. 2009)
(finding “in addition to ‘immutability,’ the Board requires that a particular social group have: ‘(1) social
visibility, meaning that members possess characteristics . . . visible and recognizable by others in the
native country, . . . (2) be defined with sufficient particularity to avoid indeterminacy, . . . and (3) not be
defined exclusively by the fact that its members have been targeted for persecution[.],” (citing Scatambuli
v. Holder, 558 F.3d 53, 59 (1st Cir. 2009))); Mendoza-Marquez v. Holder, 345 Fed. Appx. 31, 32 (5th Cir.
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precedent memorandum dispositions.
B. The Eighth Circuit’s Application of S-E-G- to Political Opinion
In Marroquin-Ochoma, the Eight Circuit considered whether a bank worker
who received telephonic and written threats against her life if she did not give money
to or join the Mara Salvatrucha in Guatemala was persecuted on account of her
115
social group and/or anti-gang political opinion.
Eighth Circuit Judge Melloy
concluded that mere refusal to join a gang does not compel a finding that subsequent
threats were on account of an imputed political opinion, stating that “[o]pposition to
a gang such as Mara Salvatrucha may have a political dimension, but refusal to join
116
the gang is not necessarily politically motivated.” Judge Melloy reasoned that:
[A]t most, evidence that the gang is politically minded could be
considered evidence that the gang members would be somewhat
more likely to attribute political opinions to resisters. But even
were we to conclude that Mara Salvatrucha does in fact operate ‘in
a political framework,’ a ‘generalized ‘political’ motive underlying
the [gang’s] forced recruitment [would be] inadequate to
establish . . . the proposition that’ the gang believes resistance to
those recruitment efforts is based on an anti-gang political
117
opinion.
Encountering a “dearth of evidence in the record supporting a contrary
conclusion,” Judge Melloy used Matter of S-E-G- to find that asylum cannot be
granted on the grounds of political opinion where there is “no evidence in the record
that the respondents were politically active or made any anti-gang political
118
statements.”
The Eighth Circuit’s extensive treatment of Marroquin-Ochoma’s claimed
political opinion and failure to address her social group claim may indicate that the
Circuit is not ready to adopt either of S-E-G-’s social group requirements.
C.

Circuits Applying S-E-G’s Social Visibility and Particularity Factors
to Non-Gang Cases

Several circuit courts have cited to S-E-G- in cases not involving gang
persecution. In one particularly interesting case, Ninth Circuit Judge Kleinfeld found
that a Bulgarian petitioner’s’ friendship and support of Roma people did not amount
119
to membership in a particular social group.
Judge Kleinfeld used this case to
2009) (rejecting the social group of a family targeted by the Mara Salvatrucha in El Salvador and
deferring to the BIA’s “construction of a statute that it administers if the BIA’s interpretation is
reasonable.”).
115. Marroquin-Ochoma v. Holder, 574 F.3d 574, 579 (8th Cir. 2009).
116. Id.
117. Id. at 578.
118. Id.
119. Donchev v. Mukasey, 553 F.3d 1206 (9th Cir. 2009) (“As the BIA itself has recognized,
the immutability requirement may be inapplicable in some circumstances. Wealth, even a trivial amount
of it, targeted many “kulaks” and “landlords” for persecution in the Soviet Union and Communist China.
According to the State Department’s Profile on Bulgaria and other evidence in the record, people in
Bulgaria who have Roma friends are not targeted for persecution as the kulaks and landlords were.”).
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expound on the purposes of asylum and the dangers of expanding refugee status,
arguing that “[o]verexpansion of refugee status to include amorphous social groups
is unfair to other immigrants, because asylum jumps people to the head of the line of
120
those seeking permission to live in the United States.”
While arguing that
Chevron deference to the BIA’s interpretation of membership in a particular social
group was required, Kleinfeld found the social visibility analysis too “abstract” to be
121
of real use.
He stated that “when we are talking about membership in something
other than a tribe or clan, this definition is not very helpful to deciding cases because
the abstractness allows most disputes to be decided either way. What is
122
‘fundamental’ or ‘innate’ to one person may be a passing fancy to another.”
Ultimately, Judge Kleinfeld found that the applicant’s friendship and advocacy on
behalf of Bulgarian Roma persons was not a common immutable characteristic, as it
was possible to change the characteristic:
Persons who have declined to join gangs, who have not served in
the military, and who have declined to pay money to drug dealers,
differ in obvious ways from the Tutsis in Rwanda, most obviously
in that they have chosen a course of conduct that led others to harm
them, whereas the Tutsis did not. Donchev’s claim arises out of
the choices he made in his friends. We cannot say that ‘any
reasonable fact finder would be compelled to conclude that
Donchev’s friendship with Roma individuals and the Roma people
123
made him part of a particular social group.
This analysis ignores a crucial part of the Acosta social group formulation:
that the characteristic uniting a social group can either be one that is immutable, or
one so fundamental to the identities or consciences of its members that they should
124
not be required to change it.
Judge B. Fletcher wrote a powerful dissent arguing
that the traditional Acosta approach provides a clearer method of analysis. Judge
Fletcher found Donchev’s social group to be valid under Acosta, reasoning that
Donchev’s “friendships with, support, and defense of the Roma” was a common
immutable characteristic so “fundamental to his individual identity and conscience
125
[that] he should not be required to change it.”
The First Circuit has accepted the relevance of the social visibility of a
126
social group in the asylum context. In an opinion by Judge Lynch, the court

120. Id. at 1217. This desire to limit the availability of asylum is shared by Professor David
Martin, now principal deputy general counsel for the Department of Homeland Security. See David
Martin, “The Refugee Concept: On Definitions, Politics, and the Careful Use of Scarce Resources” in H.
Adelman (ed.), Refugee Policy: Canada and the United States (1991) 30, reprinted in David Martin et al.,
Forced Migration Law and Policy 59-65 (Thomson/West 2007).
121. Id. at 1216.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 1220. Such arguments are particularly disturbing as they shift the blame onto
individuals who have chosen to exercise liberties that should be afforded every human being. Kleinfeld’s
contention that an individual’s elected course of conduct does not warrant the same type of protection as
persecution resulting from no individual election could easily be used to argue that those who “chose” to
practice Judaism in Germany during the Holocaust elected their fate, a contention that any reasonable fact
finder would be compelled to overturn.
124. Matter of Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211 (BIA 1985).
125. Donchev, 553 F.3d at 1222-23.
126. Scatambuli v. Holder, 558 F.3d 53, 55-57 (1st Cir. 2009).
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affirmed the BIA’s denial of asylum to a Brazilian couple fearing persecution on
127
account of their membership in a social group of “informants.”
The First Circuit
emphasized that this case did not “present the broad issue of whether informants who
voluntarily provide information about illegality to law enforcement can ever be
128
members of a particular social group.” In this case, the First Circuit found that the
BIA’s finding that the particular informants involved lacked social visibility was
129
based on substantial evidence.
Judge Lynch also refused to “explore whether
there is any tension between looking into the visibility of a particular social group
and the requirement that members of a group share an immutable or fundamental
130
characteristic.”
The court’s reluctance to address this issue suggests its awareness
that the recent addition of social visibility may be in conflict with the traditional
Acosta formulation. The court did, however, reject the petitioner’s argument to “the
extent petitioners are arguing the BIA is precluded from considering the visibility of
131
a group.”
Therefore, the First Circuit seems to consider social visibility as a
factor, but not necessarily as a requirement.
In October 2008, the Second Circuit found that the proposed social group of
“people who are targeted for gang violence because they are caught between rival
132
criminal gangs but are not protected by police in China” lacked social visibility.
Indeed, the court, in its summary order opinion, concluded that the petitioner had not
shown that his proposed social group was “generally perceived as a distinct group by
133
Chinese society.”
The Second Circuit found the petitioner’s failure to sufficiently
establish the social visibility of his proposed social group “fatal to claims for asylum
134
and withholding of removal.”
The opinion also cites S-E-G- for the proposition
that “shared past experiences alone do not suffice to define a particular social
135
group.”
Although the facts of the case are not available in the appellate opinion,
the court uses Matter of S-E-G- and Matter of E-A-G- to summarily dispose of this
claim. The opinion itself is only a few pages long and upholds a BIA affirmance
without opinion on the original IJ decision. This unpublished decision suggets that
the Second Circuit may treat social visibility as a requirement for social group cases.
The Tenth Circuit cited to S-E-G- only for the holding that membership in a
particular social group requires that the group have particular and well-defined
136
boundaries.
Judge Holmes held that the Nigerian respondent’s proposed social
group of “students who were forced to join a violent fraternity” was impermissibly
137
circular and too broad.
The Tenth Circuit’s holding seems to rest on the more
traditional common immutable characteristic approach of Acosta:
[W]e can say unequivocally that a criminal gang/cult like the Black
Axe Confraternity does not qualify as a ‘social group’ under the

127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.

Id. at 56-58.
Id. at 60 (emphasis added).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Ming Jiang v. Mukasey, 296 Fed. Appx. 166, 168 (2d Cir. 2008).
Id. at 168.
Id. at 168-69.
Id. at 168.
Nkwonta v. Mukasey, 295 Fed. Appx. 279, 286 (10th Cir. 2008).
Id. at 285.
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‘immutable characteristic’ test that this court has adopted for
evaluating social-group persecution claims . . . To state the
obvious, membership in a criminal gang/cult is not something that
a person either cannot change or should not be required to
138
change.
The Court did not discuss social visibility, possibly indicating that the Tenth Circuit
may not agree with the analysis suggested by S-E-G-.
D. The Seventh Circuit’s Rejection of S-E-G-’s Social Visibility
As the lone circuit thus far to reject S-E-G-’s social visibility requirement,
139
the Seventh Circuit did so vehemently in Gatimi v. Holder. In an opinion authored
140
by Judge Posner, the Court found that Kenyan defectors of the Mungiki constitute
141
a particular social group.
Attacking first the logic behind social visibility, Judge
Posner stated:
it makes no sense; nor has the Board attempted, in this or any other
case, to explain the reasoning behind the criterion of social
visibility. Women who have not yet undergone female genital
mutilation in tribes that practice it do not look different from
anyone else. A homosexual in a homophobic society will pass as
heterosexual. If you are a member of a group that has been
targeted for assassination or torture or some other mode of
persecution, you will take pains to avoid being socially visible; and
to the extent that the members of the target group are successful in
remaining invisible, they will not be ‘seen’ by other people in the
142
society ‘as a segment of the population.’
Highlighting the absurdity of applying social visibility here, Posner
comments: “The only way, on the Board’s view, that the Mungiki defectors can
qualify as members of a particular social group is by pinning a target to their backs
143
with the legend ‘I am a Mungiki defector.’”
While mindful of the Supreme
Court’s determination that the BIA should be afforded deference and have an
144
opportunity to opine on difficult social group issues in the first instance, Judge

138. Id.
139. Gatimi v. Holder, 578 F.3d 611 (7th Cir. 2009). In the final stages of editing this article
the Seventh Circuit issued a highly relevant decision, also authored by Judge Posner, rejecting social
visibility once more and granting withholding to a Salvadoran former gang member who feared for his life
or freedom based on his former gang membership. See Benitez Ramos v. Holder, 589 F.3d 426 (7th Cir.
2009).
140. The Mungiki sect is known for forcibly circumcising women and stripping women
wearing trousers and miniskirts in public, among other practices. For a description on the Mungiki sect,
see Gray Phombeah, Profile: Kenya’s Secretive Mungiki Sect, BBC News Online, (Feb. 11, 2003),
available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/2745421.stm.
141. Gatimi, 578 F.3d at 615-16 (referring to various social groups identified in Sepulveda v.
Gonzales, 464 F.3d 770, 771-72 (7th Cir. 2006), the Court found the “Mungiki [to] constitute a group with
as much coherence as children of the bourgeoisie, or of the aristocracy, had in the Soviet Union:
breakaway factions that were relentlessly persecuted.”).
142. Id. at 615; see also Benitez Ramos, 589 F.3d at 430-31.
143. Id. at 616.
144. Gonzales v. Thomas, 547 U.S. 183 (2006) (per curiam).
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Posner points out that in “regarding ‘social visibility’ as a criterion for determining
145
‘particular social group,’ the Board has been inconsistent rather than silent.”
Rejecting Chevron deference, Posner argues that
[w]hen an administrative agency’s decisions are inconsistent, a
court cannot pick one of the inconsistent lines and defer to that
one, unless only one is within the scope of the agency’s discretion
to interpret the statutes it enforces or to make policy as Congress’s
delegate. Such picking and choosing would condone arbitrariness
146
and usurp the agency’s responsibilities.
Finally, the Seventh Circuit recognized that other circuit courts have
“approved ‘social visibility’ as a criterion” in their particular social group
147
determinations.
While Judge Posner agreed with the results reached by his sister
circuits (rejection of the formulated social groups) he concluded “[w]e just don’t see
what work “social visibility” does; the candidate groups flunked the basic ‘social
group’ test . . . declared in cases like Lwin, Kasinga, and Acosta (where the test
148
originated).”
The authors are hopeful that the Seventh Circuit’s decisions in
Gatimi and Benitez Ramos will encourage other circuits to free themselves from the
confines of the Chevron deference that they have been applying to S-E-G-’s social
visibility and particularity requirements and return to the original Acosta test as
Judge Posner and other Circuit Judges, including Judge B. Fletcher suggest.
V. THE POTENTIAL NEGATIVE IMPACT OF MATTER OF S-E-G- AND “SOCIAL
VISIBILITY” ON CLAIMS INVOLVING GENDER AND SEXUAL ORIENTATION
In the year since the BIA issued its decision in Matter of S-E-G-, the
negative impact on social group cases involving gang-related persecution has been
clear. Ten circuit courts have cited the case with approval. With the exception of
the Seventh Circuit’s grant of withholding in Benitez Ramos, Circuit courts have
uniformly denied gang-related claims.149 Anecdotally, U.S. asylum practitioners
generally believe that Immigration Judges are denying gang-related claims in light of
S-E-G-. Advocates fear that S-E-G-’s elevation of social visibility from a factor in
the determination of social group to a requirement poses a risk for other social group
cases. In particular, S-E-G-’s broad holdings may affect claims involving gender and
150
sexual orientation.

145. Gatimi, 578 F.3d at 615-16 (“It has found groups to be ‘particular social groups’ without
reference to social visibility, In re Kasinga, 21 I. & N. Dec. at 365-66 (young women of a tribe that
practices female genital mutilation but who have not been subjected to it); In re Toboso-Alfonso, 20 I. &
N. Dec. 819, 822-23 (BIA 1990) (homosexuals); In re Fuentes, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 662 (former members of
the national police); cf. In re Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 233-34 (refusing to classify socially invisible
groups as particular social groups.).
146. Id. at 616 (internal citations omitted).
147. Id.
148. Id. (internal citations omitted).
150. See Marouf, supra n. 17; see also, Bah v. Mukasey, 529 F.3d 99, 110 n. 13 (2d Cir. June
11, 2008) (where the BIA stated in the underlying case that it doubted “that young Bambara women who
oppose arranged marriage have the kind of social visibility that would make them readily identifiable to
those who would be inclined to persecute them”).
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Former Attorney General Michael Mukasey cited both Matter of S-E-Gand Matter of E-A-G- in his recent action on the domestic violence case, Matter of R151
A-.
The AG flagged these two gang-related decisions, along with Matter of A-M152
153
E- & J-G-U and Matter of C-A-, as decisions relevant to Matter of R-A- due to
their elaboration on the terms “persecution,” “on account of” and “particular social
group.” This is particularly troubling as women who oppose and suffer domestic
violence are certainly no more “visible” than youth opposing gang persecution.
Indeed, for years advocates have had to contend with the difficulties posed by the
154
fact that most forms of persecution against women occur in the “private” realm.
Social visibility “raises the specter of the private/public distinction by requiring
155
members of a particular social group to have a public face.”
Moreover, S-E-G-’s requirement of the social visibility of a social group
may affect cases involving Female Genital Cutting (FGC), which have been
established in U.S. asylum jurisprudence for the last thirteen years following
156
Kasinga.
The UNHCR letter to AG Holder of March 19, 2009, warned that a
“typical Togolese tribal member [would not] inevitably be aware of young women
157
who opposed female genital mutilation but had not been subjected to the practice.”
These cases could also be affected by S-E-G-’s holding on political opinion. If an
anti-gang opinion and belief in the rule of law is not a political opinion, then antiFGC opinion and a belief in the sanctity of a woman’s body seems similarly shaky.
Sexual orientation cases are similarly at risk. The UNHCR letter also
warned that the “general population of Cuba would not automatically recognize
homosexuals,” so asylum seekers fleeing persecution on the basis of their sexual
orientation, unless highly visible, may potentially have their claims rejected in light
158
of S-E-G-.
Often, social stigma forces gay and lesbian asylum seekers to hide
159
their sexual orientation in their country of origin.
Lesbians in particular may be
affected by the requirement of social visibility as they “often remain completely
160
invisible in the public sphere.”
Requiring a level of social visibility may preclude

151. Matter of R-A-, Interim Decision. 24 I. & N. Dec. 629 (Sept. 25 2008). In re R-A-, 22 I.
& N. Dec. 906 (2001) worked its way through the asylum system since 1996. Rodi Alvarado, the
applicant, made several failed appeals to the Guatemalan police for protection from her husband’s extreme
domestic abuse. Eventually, she fled to the US and applied for asylum. Her case was pending for more
than ten years. Most recently, Attorney General Mukasey certified R-A- and ordered the BIA to
reconsider the case, removing the requirement that the BIA await the issuance of proposed regulations.
The BIA remanded to the IJ, who requested briefing on the issue of social visibility. DHS responded that
it did not oppose a grant of asylum. Ms. Alvarado was recently granted asylum by the IJ. See generally
Ctr. for Gender & Refugee Studies, Documents and Information of Rodi Alvarado’s Claim for Asylum in
the U.S., http://cgrs.uchastings.edu/campaigns/alvarado.php (last visited Apr. 15 2010).
152. In re A-M-E- & J-G-U-, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 70-77.
153. In re C-A-, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 951, 953, 955-56, 958-60.
154. See Marouf, supra n. 17 at 94-99 (discussing how social visibility affects domestic
violence, family based, and human trafficking claims).
155. Id.
156. Matter of Kasinga, 21 I. & N. Dec. 357.
157. UNHCR Letter, supra n. 71 at 4.
158. Id. (citing Toboso-Alfonso, 20 I. & N. Dec. 819 (BIA 1990)).
159. See Marouf, supra n. 17 at 79; See also Sharalyn Jordan, Un/Convention(al) Refugees:
Accounts of Escape and Exile from Homophobic and Transphobic Persecution. Presentation at Centre for
Refugee Studies Annual Student Conference, York University, Canada (April 16, 2009) (on file with
author).
160. See Marouf, supra n. 17 at 84.
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all homosexual asylum seekers but “effeminate men or butch lesbians” from being
granted asylum “because they are the only ones perceived as homosexual by their
161
societies.”
Clear practical difficulties arise in applying social visibility as a standard.
Social perception depends on several factors operating at a given time or in a certain
162
context.
The concept of social visibility “ignores the ways in which power
relations shape social identities and influence the relative visibility or invisibility of
163
various groups.”
Indeed, some societies purposely ignore social groups, denying
164
their existence and thus, visibility.
Because social visibility is often not a black or
165
white issue,
making it a requirement for a valid social group will lead to
inconsistent and unreliable results. It will also be very difficult for adjudicators to
derive “social visibility” from traditional types of documentary evidence (the kind
166
ordinarily submitted in asylum claims).
Generally, little information exists as to
how a particular society perceives or does not perceive a particular group. Thus, the
only way to really tell that a group had been “perceived” as such in the past would be
where that group has been singled out for persecution. Thus, social visibility could
create a quasi-requirement of past persecution.
Overall, S-E-G-’s approach to social visibility could pose an obstacle for
gender and other social group cases. The fact that gender cases have not yet been so
affected suggests that social visibility is a tool adjudicators employ to avoid granting
asylum in politically unpopular cases. Indeed, whether or not asylum is granted
largely depends on the adjudicator and location in which the applicant applies, with
certain jurisdictions manifesting clear preference for applicants from certain
167
countries of origin.
Alternatively, perhaps it is just too soon to tell how social
168
visibility will affect these groups.
VI. LESSONS FROM CANADA: CANADIAN JURISPRUDENCE IN CENTRAL AMERICAN
GANG CASES.
As the other North American asylum-receiving country, Canada’s
jurisprudence may shed light on Central American gang-related asylum claims. A
review of eighteen gang cases issued between 2005 and 2009 by both the
Immigration and Refugee Board (IRB) of Canada, and the Federal Court, reveal the
following three themes:
1. Most IRB and Federal Court cases found that state protection against
169
170
gangs in the country of origin (usually El Salvador or Honduras ) was adequate
161. Id. at 87.
162. Id. at 73-74.
163. Id. at 105.
164. Marouf gives the example of homosexuals in Iran, but other groups are possible to
imagine – for example, Central American governments often deny that there is a gang problem, thus
denying visibility and the existence of gang-related persecution victims.
165. Id. at 83.
166. Id. at 76-78.
167. J. Ramji-Nogales et al., Refugee Roulette: Disparities in Asylum Adjudication, 60 STAN.
L. REV. 2 (2007).
168. The pending Matter of R-A- decision should give us an indication of how the BIA will
address gender cases using the notion of social visibility.
169. Mejia v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2006] F.C. 12 (Can.)
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and that the individual applicant lacked an individualized risk of harm, but risked
only more generalized violence affecting the entire population in the country of
origin. In several cases the courts found that efforts by Central American
governments to address the gang problem demonstrated state willingness and ability
172
to protect individual applicants fleeing gang violence.
2. The Canadian courts held that an applicant found to be a member of the
Maras was inadmissible under Section 37(1)(a) of the Immigration and Refugee
173
Protection Act, S.C. 2001.
No exceptions were made for child members of the
Maras. For example, in one case, the IRB held that a thirteen-year-old made a
conscious decision to join a gang and was thus inadmissible under Section
174
37(1)(a).
3. A few Canadian cases provide some hope to those fleeing gang-related
persecution in Central America. These cases are discussed below.
In 2006, Judge Gibson decided the case of a twenty-three year old
175
Guatemalan man fleeing persecution at the hands of the Mara 18.
Judge Gibson
determined that the IRB had neither properly considered the applicant’s claim nor
provided sufficient rationale for its denial. The decision was set aside in light of
evidence supporting the applicant’s assertions regarding country conditions in
Guatemala.
Justice Shore seems to be an emerging champion for asylum applicants
176
fleeing gang related violence in Central America.
In 2006, Justice Shore
overturned an IRB ruling based on a lack of state protection from gangs in

(denying section 97 protection as the applicant was the subject of a generalized problem in his country and
the applicant had not submitted clear and convincing evidence that state protection was unavailable);
Panigua v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2008] F.C. 1085 (Can.) (finding that
although the applicant faced an individualized risk of harm, state protection was available); Medina v.
Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2003] F.C. 1465 (Can.) (affirming IRB holding that
state protection was available in El Salvador); Velasquez v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and
Immigration), [2009] F.C. 109 (Can.) (deferring to IRB’s findings on availability of state protection and
an internal flight alternative and holding that failure to seek state protection due to fear of reprisal by the
Maras is insufficient).
170. Acosta v. Canada (The Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2009] F.C. 213 (Can.)
(approving IRB finding that the applicant had only a generalized, rather than personal, risk of harm).
171. 2006 CanLII 62248 (I.R.B.)
172. 2006 CanLII 61231 (I.R.B.) (holding that the Honduran woman who suffered gang rape
by her former husband and Mara Salvatrucha members did not seek state protection, that police corruption
in Honduras does not affect the applicant’s claim, and that the crackdown on gangs shows government
willingness to act); 2007 CanLII 70660 (I.R.B) (finding El Salvador’s Super Firm Hand plan and other
steps demonstrate the availability of state protection and that applicant, living in a democracy, should have
sought state protection.); 2006 CanLII 61808 (I.R.B.) (holding that the Salvadoran government is willing
and able to offer protection to its nationals and is making serious efforts to control the gang; further,
applicant did not show that her efforts to seek protection were adequate.); 2005 CanLII 60088 (I.R.B.)
(finding that El Salvador offers sufficient state protection and that the applicant’s claim was not credible).
173. Mendoza v. Canada (The Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness),
[2007] F.C. 934 (Can.).
174. 2007 CanLII 47735 (I.R.B.) (May 22 2007) (“(E)ven at age 14 [sic], [applicant] had the
knowledge and mental capacity to understand that he was joining a gang and that there were obligations
and consequences that would flow.”).
175. Luis Alejandro Lemus Ortiz v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2006]
F.C. 404 (Can.).
176. But see Justice Shore’s decision in Ayala v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and
Immigration), 2007 F.C. 690 (Can.) (affirming the IRB’s findings on state protection and credibility in the
case of two Salvadoran applicants fleeing gang violence).
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177

Honduras.
The IRB had failed to consider documentary evidence “contradicting
the supposed availability and effectiveness of State protection for [Honduran]
178
citizens having to deal with gang-related problems.”
On the issue of a generalized risk versus an individual risk of gang
persecution, Justice de Montigny remanded a Refugee Protection Division decision
involving a Salvadoran fleeing the MS-13, explaining:
It cannot be accepted, by implication at least, that the applicant had
been threatened by a well-organized gang that was terrorizing the
entire country, according to the documentary evidence, and in the
same breath surmise that this same applicant would not be exposed
to a personal risk if he were to return to El Salvador. It could very
well be that the Mara Salvatruchas recruit from the general
population; the fact remains that Mr. Pineda, if his testimony is to
be believed, had been specifically targeted and was subjected to
repeated threats and attacks. On that basis, he was subjected to a
179
greater risk than the risk faced by the population in general.
The Refugee Protection Division had rested their conclusion that the applicant faced
no individualized risk solely on his assertion that the gang “recruited across the
180
country and targeted all levels of society.”
In 2008, Justice Mosley remanded the case of a Salvadoran orphan recruited
181
by the Mara 18, in light of the Refugee Protection Division panel’s failure to
consider reasonableness in their analysis of the applicant’s internal flight
182
alternative.
More recently, in Sanchez v. Minister of Citizenship and Immigration,
the Court granted a stay of removal in the case of a Salvadoran youth persecuted by
183
MS-13.
Justice Shore found “significant new information that conditions [in El
Salvador] had worsened and that the state’s ‘serious efforts’ to control gangs had
failed.
The Super Mano dura (super heavy hand) was discredited as
184
counterproductive, and fizzled out by the end of 2007.”
Canadian jurisprudence on gang-related asylum claims includes no
discussion of social group or social visibility. Instead, the cases focus on
individualized risk and whether the country of origin is unwilling or unable to offer
protection. It is possible, then, given the lack of focus on social group, that the Mira
siblings in S-E-G- might have been granted asylum in Canada. Assuming they could

177. Fabio Yovanny Gonzalez Membreno v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and
Immigration), [2006] F.C. 439 (Can.).
178. Id. at ¶ 18.
179. Pineda v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2007] F.C. 365 at ¶ 15.
180. Id. at ¶ 8.
181. Wilber Orlando Cartagena v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2008]
F.C. 289 (Can.).
182. Id. at ¶ 11-12 (“The panel failed to thoroughly assess the reasonableness of the locations
suggested as viable IFAs in the context of Mr. Cartagena’s situation and vulnerable mind-set. A young
man with little education and no prospects in any field other than menial labor is in a high risk category.
His lack of family and fragile psychological state compound that risk.”).
183. Balmore Alexander Ramos Sanchez v. Minister of Citizenship and Immigration and the
Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness, [2009] F.C. 101 (Can.).
184. Id. at ¶ 44. See discussion of Mano Dura, supra page 3.
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establish credibility, the siblings would have probably been able to demonstrate an
individual risk of persecution. Finally, following the Sanchez case, the Canadian
courts may have found the Salvadoran government unable to protect those fleeing
gang persecution.
VII. CONCLUSION
S-E-G highlights the complexity of U.S. social group jurisprudence and a
need for additional clarity. One way this clarity could be achieved is by amending
the Refugee Act of 1980 to include a definition for social group. As Judge Fletcher
186
suggests in her Donchev dissent, the Acosta formulation provides a clear approach
to social group cases. Indeed, courts in other jurisdictions worldwide have adopted
187
the Acosta standard.
Affirming the Acosta formulation for social group would
ensure U.S. conformity with other asylum-receiving countries, such as Canada, New
Zealand, and the United Kingdom, who have accepted that definition of social
188
group.
In recent years, organizations working on behalf of asylum seekers have
discussed such an amendment. Clearly, there are risks in amending the definition of
social group. Defining social group may exclude future unanticipated groups of
asylum seekers; nevertheless, careful drafting could avoid this outcome.
The current AG could intervene as former AG Reno did in the case of
Matter of R-A- and order the BIA to revisit S-E-G- while simultaneously
encouraging the Department of Justice to issue regulations on the subject of
189
membership in a particular social group.
Such action is particularly appropriate in
light of the aforementioned inconsistencies in the BIA’s interpretation of
membership in a particular social group and the wide range of Circuit court treatment
of the issue. The clearest solution would be the aforementioned return to the Acosta
formulation of social group membership.
Short of legislative change, new regulations or a favorable review of S-E-G,
how can advocates best represent victims of gang-related persecution? How can
judges best approach these cases? Perhaps these cases provide an opportunity for
190
truly creative lawyering. As Mathew Lister explains, these cases do fall within the
traditional asylum paradigm, and “with creative formulation and use of evidence,

185. In reviewing Canadian case law, establishing credibility seems to be an issue. In
particular, although there is no deadline to apply for asylum (as in the United States, where a one-year
deadline is imposed, Immigration and Nationality Act §208(a)(2)(B)), Canadian adjudicators find that
even a few months’ delay in applying for asylum can undermine credibility. Participants in the 2009
Centre for Refugee Studies Annual Student Conference at York University in Toronto, Canada, agreed
with this observation.
186. See Matter of Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 21.
187. See UNHCR Letter, supra n. 71 at 4, n. 3.
188. Id. citing, for example, Canada v. Ward [1993] 2 S.C.R. 689 (Can.); Islam v. Secretary of
State for the Home Department and R. v. Immigration Appeal Tribunal and Secretary of State for the
Home Department, ex parte Shah, UK House of Lords, [1999] 2 W.L.F. 1015. Australia has adopted a
social perception approach but takes into account immutable characteristics. See Applicant A v. Minister
for Imm. & Ethnic Affairs (1997) 190 C.L.R. 225 (Austl.)
189. See, e.g., Attorney General Reno’s order overturning the decision in Matter of R-A- (Jan.
19 2001), available through the Center for Gender & Refugee Studies, supra n. 150.
190. Nathan Brooks, In Praise of Creativity: Gang-Based “Social Group” Claims in Asylum
Cases, 56-FEB Fed. Law. 26 Feb. 2009.
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applicants in this emerging genre of asylum claims may experience more success.”
A lesson from the recent Canadian Sanchez case is to carefully focus on country
conditions. Attempts to distinguish each gang-related persecution claim from the
facts of S-E-G- are also advisable. Where possible, advocates should show that the
client’s actions demonstrate a political opinion, imputed political opinion, or a
religious belief. Most importantly, lawyers representing clients fleeing gang
192
persecution should use available resources and other lawyers.
In the long term, improving the prospects for gang-related cases will require
changing the public perception of those fleeing violence by gangs and criminal
entities. Adjudicators and politicians alike need education on the nuances of the gang
phenomenon so that conversations on the topic can move past a negative reaction to
the word “gang.” These nuances include distinguishing cases of forced recruitment
of children from cases involving former gang members. Further, it is necessary for
adjudicators to understand the range of socio-economic factors leading to gang
membership.
When representing individual clients, advocates can also specifically attack
the application of the concept of social visibility. First, as the Seventh Circuit has
recognized in Gatimi and Benitez Ramos, courts should not defer to the BIA’s
concept of social visibility because it is an unexplained departure from established
193
BIA precedent.
Second, social visibility should not be a requirement for a
particular social group as it is not considered for those claiming asylum based on
other grounds such as race, religion, nationality, or political opinion. Finally, where
evidence of perception is scant, application of a social visibility standard risks
194
conflation of other required elements of a successful asylum claim.
This is
because where actual evidence of visibility is lacking, adjudicators will likely rely on
evidence of harm (thereby conflating the persecution requirement), level of risk (thus
conflating the “well-founded fear” requirement), or causal nexus (conflating the “on
195
account of” requirement).
The resulting inquiry becomes repetitive, as “social
visibility” provides no further guidance to the adjudicator than do the traditional
asylum elements.
Other legislative approaches to the situation may involve specifically
196
addressing the gang-related persecution issue.
An effective response to the plight
of youth who resist gang recruitment must address the roots of the problem. To that
end, the United States should focus on helping Central American nations address the

191. See Lister, supra n. 13 at 852.
192. See, e.g., Capital Area Immigrants’ Rights, Seeking Asylum from Gang-Based Violence:
A Resource Manual (2007), www.ailf.org/lac/GangResourceManual.pdf; Washington Office on Latin
America, Central American Gang-Related Asylum Guide (2008), www.wola.org; National Center for
Immigrant and Refugee Children, Gang-related Asylum Resources, http://uscri.refugees.org/site/PageNav
igator/Resource%20Library/Asylum_Research_Gang_Related. The Center for Gender and Refugee
Studies also provides technical assistance on social group cases and has developed expertise in this area
after receiving numerous requests for assistance with gang-related persecution claims. See
http://cgrs.uchastings.edu/assistance/index.php (last visited Apr. 15, 2010).
193. See discussion of Chevron deference, supra n. 55.
194. See Marouf, supra n. 17 at 104.
195. Id. at 76.
196. Funes, supra n. 7 at 332-37 (giving suggestions on U.S. law reform, including amending
the definition of “aggravated felony” under the 1996 Immigration laws, entering into bilateral treaties on
removal with specific Central American nations, and amending federal regulations to permit youths
fleeing gang violence to be granted asylum).
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gang phenomenon.
It seems that the Obama administration is attempting to do so,
at least tangentially. The Department of Homeland Security Secretary increased in
the number of U.S. law enforcement officers on the border, as part of the effort to
198
help Mexico break up drug cartels. The administration has also pledged a renewed
199
commitment to the Central American Fingerprint Exchange Initiative and the
200
Transnational Anti-Gang Initiative.
Despite the progress, more specific reform
efforts – including rehabilitating former gang members, addressing gang violence,
confronting police corruption, protecting youth, and empowering individuals to resist
gang recruitment – are needed to ensure a long-term solution to the gang-persecution
problem.

197. See Funes, supra n. 7 at 330-33. See also Musalo, supra n. 84 at 139-44 (noting U.S.
influence in Guatemala due to its provision of economic assistance to Guatemala). This argument applies
to other Central American countries receiving U.S. aid.
198. Fox News, U.S. to Redirect Resources to Stop Spillover Violence from Mexico (Mar. 24,
2009), http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2009/03/24/redirect-resources-stop-spillover-violence-mexico.
199. This initiative was developed to collect, store and integrate biometric data from El
Salvador, Guatemala, Belize, Honduras, and the Mexican state of Chiapas. Id.
200. This initiative coordinates the sharing of gang intelligence between the U.S. and El
Salvador, where the gang MS-13 originated. Id. For other recent U.S. efforts to address the gang problem,
see Funes, supra n. 7 at 330-33.

